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Following Ellsberg's (1961) classical experiments, it has become widely accepted that the preferences of empirical decision-makers often violate the consistency conditions characteristic of classical Subjective Expected Utility theory, and in particular that they fail to reveal a well-defined subjective probability measure.
There exists by now a variety of axiomatic models designed to accommodate Ellsbergian behavior; the two most frequently studied are the Choquet and Maximin Expected Utility Models (CEU respectively MMEU) due to Schmeidler (1989) r e spectively Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) .
While on a heuristic and rhetorical level the episternic distinction between risk and uncertainty has been importaint in stimulating an interest in such non-standard models, little work has been done in determining their epistemic content, i.e. in relating preferences to appropriate notions of belief (see Epstein-Zhang (1996) , SarinWakker (1995) , and Nehring (1994.) , as well as Ghirardato (1996) , Mukerjee (1996) , and Nehring (1991) from rather different perspectives). This paper addresses a particular issue within this general problematics: when can one legitimately attribute to a11 agent an unambiguous probabilistic belief about an event or set of events? And, in a related vein: which conditions must preferences satisfy in order to reflect / be consistent with a set of given ("objective") probabilities?
A satisfactory answer to these basic quest'ons seems not only essential to an adequate understanding of models of' non-probabilistic uncertainty, it also promises to have significant value in applications. By allowing to 'localize" ambiguous beliefs, it should yield models with more specific predictions and sharper comparisons to traditional "global" expected-utility rnodels. For example, in a game-theoretic context, one may want to describe the extensive-form game itself (in particular the "moves of Nature") in standard Bayesian manner in terms of unambiguous probabilities, while allowing at the same time foir ambiguity in players' beliefs about other players' strategic choices ("strategic uncertainty") .
We will conduct the analysis in the context of the CEU or "capacity" model as does most of the existing epistemic literature. The fist thing to note is that, as simple and as elementary as they look, the questions raised do not have an obvious answer. Indeed, it will be seen that it is not even clear that any satisfactory answer exists within the CEU model.
The non-triviality of the issue becomes clear through the following preliminary consideration. For an agent to believe in the occurrence of some event A with subjective probability a, not only must the capacity of A, v (A), be equal to a, but that of the complement must be equal to its probability 1 -a also. But more is required. If in addition the agent believes in the occurrence of the disjoint set B with subjective probability P, then he also believes (of conceptual necessity) that the probability of the event AU B is equal a+P, hence v ( A U B) must be equal to a +p = u (A) +v (B).
Probability judgements have a ",logical syntax" that needs to be accounted for.
In the literature, only the very recent and thorough contribution by Zhang (1997) has taken up the issue of defining revealed probabilistic beliefs explicitly in the context of an axiomatization of CEU preferences for capacities that can be represented as "inner measuresn.l Otherwise, the special case of probability one beliefs has received quite a bit of recent interest (see Haller (1995) , Morris (1995) , Sarin-Wakker (1995) ); the issue has also connections with that of defining independent product capacities (see Hendon et al. (l99!5) , Ghirardato (1995) and Eichberger-Kelsey (1996) ; cf. section 5).
The plan for the remainder of' the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the issue of defining "revealed unambiguous events" from a capacity, and establishes criteria for the "soundness" of any proposed definition.
These criteria are violated by the simplest natural definitions (section 3). ' 
Sarin-Wakker (1992) define "revealed unambiguous partitions"
In section 4, capacities are interpreted as "rank-dependent probability assignments"; this suggests a definition of unambiguous events with a canonical look to it. It is characterized in terms of conditions on preferences wlio~e applicability and appeal are not restricted to the CEU model. All proposed definitions are shown to coincide for the class of convex capacities.
Section 5 characterizes the surprisingly strong implications of unambiguous events for the underlying capacity, and shows that the class of unambiguous events is always an algebra. The latter implies for example that whenever a decision-maker has probabilistic beliefs about the marginal distributions of each of a collection of random variables, he has probabilistic beliefs about their joint distribution as well.
This unwelcome implication might in principle be accounted for in two ways : it may indicate that the adopted definition is too strong; alternatively, it may show that the CEU model is applicable only when an agent's probabilistic beliefs take a certain form. In the concluding section 6, we argue for the latter as the more plausible interpretation.
PRELIMINARIES
Let S be a finite set of states with # S = n, and let A S denote the probability- To simplify argument and notation, we will focus on "risk-neutral" decision-makers with C = R and u = id. AS long as the "true" utility-function u is defined on a connected domain C and is continuous, this is without effective loss of generality. Under risk-neutrality, a capacity inducts a unique CEU preference-ordering k, according to the condition: x 2, y if and only if S xdv >_ J ydv.
The task is to define from a given capacity v a collection of "revealed unambiguous" events &a for which the agent is understood to have probabilistic beliefs. Within the CEU-model (which is assumed throughout), this is equivalent to defining A;a in terms of the associated preferencerelation k, due to the one-to-one relation between the two. Conceptually, a primitive definition of unambiguous events should be in terms of the preference relation a s the primitive entity; this point of view is adopted in section 4 which attempts to prlovide "the right" definition. On the other hand, the implications of any given definition are more easily described in terms of the capacity representation; likewise, the set of possible definitions is more easily surveyed in terms of the representation.
To be satisfactory, Ay should have the property that for any three events A, B, C such that the value of a probability measure on C is uniquely determined by its values on A and B, C must be in A;" whenever both A and B are. In the measuretheoretic terminology introduced by Zhang (1997) into decision-theory, &a must be a A-system. Definition 1 A collection A E 2" is a A -system if it has the following two properties: A is an algebra if it satisfies in addition z i z ) A , B~d + A n B~d .
Remark: Zhang (1997, lemma 2.1) shows that a A-system defined by i) and ii) is always closed under disjoint unions:
In general, one will not want A::a to be an algebra. For instance, if S = S1 x S2, with non-singleton S1 and S2, then AEa = {T x S 2 I T C S1) U {S1 x T I T C S 2 ) says that an agent has "unambiguous", "probzbilistic" marginal beliefs about each component of the state, but "non.-probabilistic", "ambiguous" beliefs about their joint distribution. A y is a A-system but not an algebra.
Furthermore, one will want v on Aua to be "coherently interpretable" as a probability; this is captured by Definition 2 v is probabilistically coherent on A if there exists a probability measure p on 2' that agrees with v on A.
Note that "probabilistic coherence" implies additivity of v on A but is not implied by it, even if A is a A-system (fact 2).
A successfui definition of "revealed unambiguous belief" makes it possible to express formally the notion that an agent's beliefs incorporate a set of "given" probabilities ("set of probabilistic const~.aints"). These may be thought of as information in the form of objective probabilities, but need not be. 
tent with (C, 4) , and AUa sat@Cies all the desiderata lasted above: it is a A-system, and v on AUa is pmbabilistically coherent.
Nonetheless, v is not "truly consistent" with (C, 4) . 
To illustrate clause ii), consider again example 1. Here v fails to be probabilistically coherent on AEa U {b) , whenever A;" 52 C . To be sound, v would need to satisfy
If ea is an algebra rather than merely a A-system, the second clause simplifies.
Fact 1 If A is a n dgebna, the following two statements are equivalent:
A trivial example of a sound definition of revealed unambiguous events is the constant mapping v I-+ (0, S) for all v . Thus "soundness" of the definition says only that the events given by ea can be thought of as "genuinely unambiguous / probabilistic"; it does not address the issue whether A;a comprises all "genuinely probabilistic" events.
THE PROBLEM
A particularly simple and straightforward definition of unambiguous events is given Proof. See appendix.
THE PROPOSAL
Consider a risk-neutral 5 decision-maker who has to decide between two acts x and y such that x -y is {A, A To characterize >-,-unambiguous events directly in terms of the capacity, it proves helpful to interpret capacities as "rank dependent probability assignments".
A ranking of states is a one-to-one mapping p : S -+ (1, ..., n), let R denote the set of such rankings. The ranking, p is a neighbour of p' ("pNp l ") iff, for at most two states s E S : p(s) # pl(s), and, for all s E S ,
S is called a rank-dependent probability assignment (RDPA) ifT for all p, p1 such that pNpl, and all s E S such that p(s) = pl(s) : T,({s)) = T~I({s)).
For any capacity v, define a mapping .rrv :
When there is no ambiguity, we will often drop the superscript in d ' . There is a one-t~one relation between capacities and RDPAs. 
Theorem 1 The following three statements are equivalent:
ii) A is ?,-unambiguous .
iii) For all x , y such that y is {.A, A c )-measurable, J ( x + y ) d u = J x d v + J y d u .
Proof. The implications iii) + ii) and ii) 3 i) are easily verified; by contrast, the implication i) 3 iii) is non-trivial.
Definition 6 For A E 2S, let E] denote the following equivalence relation on R : Proof of the lemma. Note first that it suffices to prove validity of the claim for neighbouring rankings p and p', since any two p and p' satisfying p %A p' can be connected by a chain of neighbowing rankings pl, ..., pk satisfying pj =A pj+l.
Assume thus pNp', take any B E 2 S , and let u (A) = a. Proof. We need only to show that A, > A: .
It is well known 6 that any convex capacity has the following representation:
v (E) = minPER 7rp ( E ) for all E E 2S.
Suppose that A 4 A,, i.e. that for some pl,p2 E 72 : rpl (A) < rp2 ( A ) . 
. IMPLICATIONS
Unambiguous events turn out both to have a surprising amount of structure themselves, and entail surprisingly strong restrictions on the capacity that hosts them.
The blame for these apparently excessive implications is tentatively assigned in the concluding section 6.
Theorem 2 For any capacity u, ,A, is an algebra.
Proof . We need to show that A, is intersection-closed. Thus, take A, B E A,,
andlet B:= { A n B , A~B C , A C n B , A C n B L ) .
Since we know that, for all p E 72, 7rp (A) = u (A) and 7rp ( B ) = v (B) , we have
We need to show that r p ( A n B ) is independent of p.
'see for example Chateauneuf-JafTray (198Y).
Consider p,p' such that p is a neighbour of F'rom the definitional property of an RDPA it follows that r p ( E ) = np, ( E ) for at least two E E B. However, in view of ( I ) , this implies that the rank-dependent probability of all four events in B stays the same, and in particular, that rp (A f l B ) = npr ( A n B ) . N o w take arbitrary p,# E 32 . It is clear that there always exist a sequence of rankings {pj)jlk such that PO = p,pk = # and ~j N p j +~ for all j < k. Since npj ( A f l B ) = rpj+l ( A n B ) for all j from the above, one obtains n, ( A f l B ) = nP, ( A n B ) a desired. . This is not all; in addition, a capac.ity is always "additively separable" across its unambiguous events.
For a capacity v , define the set of its "separating events" Theorem 3 For any capacity v:, A, =: A:.
Proof.

Av
: Take any A E A, and B E 2S. Let p be any ranking such that, for all sl E A n B , s2 E A C n B and sj (=_ B C : p ( s l ) < p ( s 2 ) < p(s3) .
By construction, r P (13) = v ( B ) .
Since p = A p~ by definition, one obtains :ram lemma 2, The key is the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If
A E &, then, for dl p E E! : T, = T,,
Proof of lemma.
For any j I n, let Sf := {s E S I p (s) 5 j ) . Fix any j . By definition, T, (s;) = v (s;) .
Since A E A",, In turn, the right-hand side of this equation is easily verified to be equal to a(,,) (s;) . We thus have n-, (s;) = n -( s ) for all j 5 n, and therefore also n-, = T P A . a
The claim of the theorem is now easily established.
We have np (A) = npA ( A ) (by lernma 3)) For C E 2S, let C* denote the algebra generated by C, C* := n {B > C I B is an algebra), and let F* denote the minimal non-empty ele nents of that algebra which form a partition of S. 
Repeated substitutions yield immediately v ( A )
Corollary 1 suggests a natural definition of the independent product of a capacity and a probability measure, for what it is worth 7 . Suppose that S = 5' 1 x S2 ,
. Let a probability 4 2 on A2 be given, as well as a "marginal capacity" y on dl analogously defined. uniquely singles out the product c.apacity ul @ 42 which has been considered (and compared to alternative definitions:) by Hendon et al. (1995) and Ghirardato (1995) , and also appears in Eichberger-Kekey (1996).
DISCUSSION
The results of section 5 indicate that a capacity-representation of preferences and probabilistic constraints on beliefs do not live together very harmoniously; in many situations, one will have to give. Which of the two will depend on one's judgement about which is more fundamental. To us, it seems evident that probabilistic constraints are the more fundamental notion; indeed, it seems hard to even imagine what kind of argument might be adduced that could render probabilistic constraints defeasible.
This judgment is confirmed by the fact that it takes very little to obtain consistency with probabilistic constraints on preferences and beliefs in a satisfactory way. In particular, consistency can be achieved in the MMEU model in which capacities are replaced by closed convex sets of probabilities IT, and Choquet integration by "maximin integration" J xdn :=min J xd?r .
~~1 7
In the MMEU-model, an event A is naturally defined as II-unambiguous if a(A) = al(A) for all a, a' E II ; note th.at this definition coincides with the one given for capacities whenever the two intepation-functionals coincide ( i.e. for convex capacities v and their core, cf. proposition 2). Under this definition, it can be shown that the preferencebased characterizatbn of unambiguous events in the manner of theorem 1 is preserved, while none of the adverse consequences are entailed. It is easily verified that the set, of II*-unambiguous events is exactly the A-system C.
Note also that the analogue to the problematic separability condition for unambiguous events as in theorem 3 is not entailed; for instance, for A = {a} x T and B = T x {a}, we have S ledn* = ! j # 0 = S lsnAdn* + l B n A C d n * , while A is n*-unambiguous.
If A, is accepted as the correct definition of unambiguous events in the CEU model (for instance on the basis of its equivalence with the class of &unambiguous events), theorems 2 and 3 are naturally read as describing epistemic pmsuppositions of the CEU model. In particular, for the CEU-model to be applicable, the decision maker's probabilistic beliefs must range over an algebra.
-It may seem hard to imagine how capacities could possibly be episternically , restrictive, since their definition. seems to involve only trivial assumptions (essentially monotonicity ) . Such an intuition. forgets, however, that capacities acquire decisiontheoretic meaning only as parameters of Choquet integrals x I+ Jxdv , a point argued extensively in Sarin-Wakker (1995) . The class of Choquet integrals, as well as the class of preference orders it serves to represent, is characterized by non-trivial properties which a priori might well be restrictive. - The analysis of this paper has been special in two dimensions: it has focused on the CEU model, and it has been concerned with unconditional probabilistic beliefs.
,
An analysis more general in both respects will be pursued in future work (Nehring 1997 ); it will entail the proposed definition A, as a special case. Then A is a A-system, and q can be extended to a capacity v such that & = A.
APPENDIX
Proof of lemma.
It is straightforward to verify th.at A is a A-system. Define v on 2' by v (A) = sup {q (E) I E E A, E 
